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Abstract 
While social inclusion and inclusive societies are commendable goals,  and also reflected in legislation 
and policies, the persistence of poverty and social deprivation suggests the need engage with how  In 
spite of legislation prohibiting caste-based exclusionary practices in India, and implementation of 
reservation policies and welfare schemes, the vast majority of the Dalits – the so-called ‘lower castes’ 
continue to Caste-based stratification represents one of the most pervasive forms of social exclusion 
injustice with the so-called ‘lower castes’ or Dalits having been historically exposed to multiple 
exclusions and the majority continuing to experience social deprivation and poverty. Associated with 
the Hindu tradition, the caste ideology legitimises inequality according to the status of birth, restricts 
interactions between the castes, and accords differential privileges according to where a person is 
placed in the caste ladder. Since gaining Independence, the government of India has enacted 
legislation penalising caste-based exclusionary practices such as untouchability, and implemented 
reservation policies as well as welfare schemes to improve the upward mobility of the Dalits.  This 
paper is concerned with the ways in which Dalits have been included in and benefited from such 
targeted legislation and schemes. Based on fieldwork conducted in 'Ambedkar' villages (with special 
programmes for Scheduled castes) and 'Non-Ambedkar' villages in Uttar Pradesh, it was found that, in 
spite of progressive legislations, schemes, central monitoring system and a pro-Dalit political party in 
power, there were no significant changes in the livelihood options of the Dalits in Ambedkar and non-
Ambedkar villages.  The paper shows that the relatively ‘high’ castes used their economic, political 
and patronage powers to influence the local government, implementing agencies and the police to 
subvert these schemes in their favour, resulting in the adverse incorporation of the Dalits into schemes 
specifically targeted to their benefit. The problem was compound by the fragmented nature of 
government and NGO interventions, which did not sufficiently recognize the interlocking and 
cumulative nature of the exclusions and atrocities experienced by poor Dalits, particularly with respect 
to their human rights, human development and human security in their daily lives. Under these 
circumstances, caste-based ideologies and practices continued to perpetuate the lower status of the 
Dalits by integrating them into programmes and schemes in accordance with dominant norms, values, 
rights and processes of inclusion and exclusion. The paper suggests that countering social inclusion 
and promoting secure and sustainable social inclusion of vulnerable groups involves unpacking and 
challenging the norms of inclusion that often validate the values of the more powerful, while 
discrediting  which often favour the more powerful  political and economic prorecognising the 
different ways in inclusion and exclusion which  multiple  the government and other concerned actors 
need to develop multiple strategies at different levels to develop more effective and sustainable ways 
of the Dalits in rural India.  
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Government-sponsored schemes, such as poverty alleviation, employment generation and 
welfare programs as well as affirmative policies to promote the representation of marginalised 
groups  are key measures used to promote social inclusion in developing countries. These 
programs, while well-intentioned, are however not always effective in contexts where 
prevailing power relations oppose initiatives challenging their structural position in society.  
This paper deals with caste-based exclusion and  the associated structural violence 
experienced by the so-called ‘low-castes’ or Schedule Castes in rural India, where dominant 
caste-based power relations uphold ideological biases and cultural practices that legitimise 
and enforce the exclusion of the so-called ‘low-caste’ groups. In spite of affirmative action on 
the part of the government, these groups continue to remain economically disadvantaged 
(Nandwani 2016).  
Caste-based discrimination contradicts the principles of the 16th Sustainable Development 
Goal that focuses on peace, justice and inclusion for all. This paper argues that effective 
inclusion of the Scheduled Caste, or the Dalits – the name they have assumed themselves - 
would require new conceptual and policy frameworks that identify the different power 
relations as well as the interlocking and cumulative nature of exclusionary practices that 
inform their daily lives, and restrict them from accessing the full benefits of government 
intervention. The paper shows that multiple forms of violence and discrimination threaten the 
human development, human rights and human security of Dalits, and especially Dalit women, 
because of inter-relational aspects between class, caste and patriarchy. The paper exposes the 
limitations of targeted interventions that do not acknowledge these power relations and 
outcomes, as well as the necessity of a multidimensional action, including strategic alliances 
and collective mobilisation with committed groups, to reduce exclusion and to promote, in 
line with the 16th SDG, a just and sustainable inclusion of Dalits in society.  
Important legislation and inclusionary policies supporting the Dalits, have been implemented 
in India since it gained its Independence in 1947. The Government of India adopted a new 
constitution in 1949 that included Articles 15 and 17, under Fundamental Rights, prohibiting 
discrimination and untouchability.1 Subsequently, laws such as the Anti-Untouchability Act 
of 1955, which became the Protection of Civil Rights Act in 1979, and the Prevention of 
Schedule Caste and Schedule Tribes Atrocities Act (1989) were passed, penalising violence 
                                                          
1 One of the   main authors of the Indian constitution, Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar, belonged to 
the Scheduled castes and took up this issue as the first Minister of Law in post-colonial India. 
Under his influence, protective and preventative measures with regard to Scheduled Castes 
were included in the Indian Constitution (adopted in 1949) 
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and discrimination against Dalits.2 The government also introduced reservations for schedule 
castes and schedule tribes in the public services, including for civil service jobs in 
administration and education and other public services. In view of their poor economic status, 
Dalits living in rural areas were also eligible for government-sponsored poverty alleviation 
programs.  
The law, complemented by favourable policies and programmes, is in line with promoting the 
social inclusion of the Dalits. The provisions are also in line with the objectives of the 16th 
SDG, and its targets including the  removal  of  all forms of violence (16.1), promotion of the 
rule of law (16.3), reduction of corruption and bribery (16.5), the development of effective, 
accountable and transparent institutions (16.6), ensuring  responsive, inclusive, participatory 
and representative decision-making at all levels  (16.7), and the promotion of and enforcement 
non-discriminatory laws and policies (16b). The Government of India has also promoted the 
political representation of women by passing the 73rd Amendment to the Constitution in 1992, 
mandating that at least 33% of the seats in local government (Panchayat) and one third of 
Chairpersons of Panchayats be reserved for women.  In many ways, the content of laws and 
policies since Indian independence has favoured social inclusion of Dalits and of women. Yet 
in spite of such measures, as will be outlined in the subsequent sections, Dalits and Dalit 
women in particular continue to face different types of exclusions that limit the potentially 
positive outcomes of legislation and special schemes. There is therefore a need to analyse the 
nature and implications of the entrenched forms of social exclusions, and to develop 
appropriate strategies so that Dalits enjoy sustainable forms of social inclusion. 
The chapter is developed along the following lines. Using Johan Galtung’s concept of 
different forms of violence, and using available secondary research, the chapter shows how 
the combination of physical, structural and cultural violence has led to long-term deficits in  
the human rights, human development and human security of the Dalits. The piece 
complements this macro data by using micro-level analysis in two villages to expose the 
local-level dynamics of caste-based power relations in the daily lives of the Dalits, 
demonstrating how the interlocking and cumulative nature of exclusions and exploitation 
prevented them, and particularly the Dalit women, from accessing their legal entitlements. It 
shows how these forms of violence combined to shape the politics of Dalit social exclusion 
and inclusion – the latter often reflecting a form of perverse incorporation where caste-based 
norms and practices were retained. The final sections pull out the implications for their rights, 
development and security, and the promotion of their sustainable social inclusion. 
About our methodology  
There are two important methodological considerations that frame the analysis. The first has 
to do with the focus on local interactions. The paper is guided by Sally Moore’s notion of 
‘semi-autonomous social fields’, that have “internally generated rules” that are the more 
“immediate forces that dictate the mode of compliance or noncompliance to state-made legal 
rules” (1973:721). She has argued that  the failure of legislation to bring about social change 
is often because “new laws are thrust upon going social arrangements in which there are 
complexes of binding obligations already in existence” with the these obligations being more 
                                                          
2 These included the Anti-Untouchability Act of 1955 (subsequently the Protection of Civil 




effective than the laws (1973:723) resulting in “piecemeal” legislation that “only partially 
invades the on-going arrangements” (1973: 743). This paper shows how caste-based 
exclusion and patriarchal norms function in semi-autonomous fields with power relations that 
enforce compliance along lines of inequality and discrimination. These controls can often be 
stronger than the law and manifest in the daily interactions of people.  
The second is the focus on the interactions during the year 2009. This choice of 2009  is based 
on the understanding that it an important moment to assess the effectiveness of favourable 
government intervention to remove caste-based exclusion. The pro-Scheduled Caste Bahujan 
Samaj Party had risen to power, and a Dalit, Mayawati Prabhu Das, had become the Chief 
Minister Uttar Pradesh in 1995, and served four other terms in office. This political progress 
was accompanied by extra attention by the government to countering caste-based atrocities, as 
well as the appointment of more scheduled caste officers in the government administrative 
services with special officers to monitor progress and implement schemes. The pro-Dalit 
Political Party, BSP (Bahujan Samaj Party), which was ruling the province during 2009, lost 
the provincial elections in 2012 to Samajwadi Party (SP), leading to the disbanding of many 
of the privileges, schemes and monitoring system started by the BSP in Ambedkar villages. In 
March 2017, the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP), a ‘right-wing Hindu’ party of the ‘upper castes’ 
defeated Samajwadi Party with a huge majority in the province. 3 While field work has also 
been done after 2009, the interactions of that year reflect how class and caste relations in 
society operate to promote exclusion and exploitation even when the political climate and 
government interventions are meant to promote inclusion. 
Characteristics of Dalit Exclusion  
According to Galtung “(w)ith the violent structure institutionalized and the violent culture 
internalized, direct violence also tends to become institutionalized, repetitive, ritualistic, like a 
vendetta” (1990:202). In his lecture, “Religions, Hard and Soft” (1994) Galtung noted that 
religious sanctions associated with the caste system under Hinduism could be seen as a form 
of structural violence manifested in both economic exploitation and political repression of 
                                                          
3 The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), currently ruling at the centre too, works from an ideology 
to transform India into a Hindu theocratic state based on the principles of the book called 
‘Manusmriti’.  The book ‘Manusmriti’ advocates a society based on four social hierarchies in 
which Dalits belongs to the lowest ladder of the society without any human rights and dignity. 
The BJP Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh, Yogi Adityanath was/is the Head Priest of the 
Gorakhnath shrine in Gorakhpur district. He is a supporter of the Rashtriya Swaim Sevak 
Sangh (an extremist Hindu outfit) ideology and founder of ‘Hindu Yuva Vahini’ (a militant 
youth wing). Under his leadership, Dalits and Minorities are under tremendous fear and stress 
for their protection and development. This has been seen in the form of open violence of the 
right-wing Hindu cow vigilante groups against Muslim minorities, and the burning of houses 
and killing of Dalits by 'higher castes' in Saharanpur. In 2005, Adityanath led a 'purification 
drive' which involved the conversion of Christians to Hinduism. In one such instance, 1,800 
Christians were reportedly converted to Hinduism in the town of Etah in Uttar Pradesh. He 
said, "I will not stop till I turn UP and India into a Hindu Rashtra (Hindu state).” 
https://www.synergiafoundation.in/news-analysis/yogi-adityanath-cm. Thus, the recent 
political changes and the rise to power of the  BJP government at the national level are 
unlikely to remove caste-based exclusion and the exposure of Dalits to structural, cultural and 
personal violence.  
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those at the bottom of the caste pyramid. His earlier work viewed patriarchy, together with 
racism and class ideologies, as part of structural violence, leaving women with low status, 
which exposed them to “cultural violence’ whenever religious ideology was used to “justify 
or legitimise direct and structural violence” against them (Galtung 1990:291). However, he 
later argued that patriarchy combined “direct, structural and cultural violence in a vicious 
triangle” with rape, repression and intimidation being part of the triangle along with structural 
violence and cultural violence. The result was that patriarchy institutionalised violence by 
ideologically internalising dominant and subordinate relationships, along gender, caste and 
identity lines, with low status women being the ultimate victims (Galtung 1996:40).  
In Galtung’s typology of violence, structural violence can be said to exist whenever: “human 
beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their 
potential realizations” (1969:168). His distinction is between physical violence (direct 
violence on the body), structural violence (which harms and kills without physical contact) 
and cultural violence (which legitimates the other two forms of violence). This three-fold 
typology of violence is especially suited to understanding long-term and enduring processes 
of caste-based power relations and discrimination in rural India. The notion of violence can be 
captured by the use of cultural violence to legitimate or obscure how unequal power relations 
result in both unequal life chances, and in direct physical violence, often with impunity.  The 
subsequent paragraphs review research highlighting how different forms of violence operated 
to produce long-term disadvantages and deficits in relation to Dalits’ human development, 
human rights and human security.  
Arguably, caste is one of oldest and most pervasive forms of social stratification, and results 
in injustices based on ascribed role differentiation. Caste stratification, traditionally associated 
with the Hindu religion, is sustained by an ideology that legitimises inequality according to 
the status of birth. Interactions between castes is restricted, and differential privileges and 
burdens are accorded, according to one’s position in the caste hierarchy. The so-called 
‘Higher castes’ and more particularly the Brahmans, have over time developed rules that 
helped ensured superior status for themselves in the overall social hierarchy; the British 
colonisers helped entrench this system (Thapar 1979:27, Srinivas 1966:5). Historically, caste 
controls have been most violently enforced on those at the lowest rungs of the caste ladder, 
the so-called Scheduled Castes, or Dalits.4 Through daily practices of humiliation and 
coercion, the ideology of Dalits as ‘untouchables’ and hence as the ‘others’ and ‘outsiders’ to 
the caste system, persisted. They were viewed as regressive, barbaric and irrational in contrast 
to those within the caste system.  
Caste discrimination in India, based on ‘ascriptive’ characteristics, has led to the long-term 
deprivation of the Dalits through limiting their access to education, employment and income 
                                                          
4 While the official categorisations still use the specific sub-castes under the category of 
Scheduled Castes, the term “Dalit’ has increasingly been used as a preferred term by the 
groups themselves. Literally meaning “down-trodden” or “oppressed” or “broken pieces”, the 
term ‘Dalit’ was taken up initially by the Dalit Panthers, a protest organisation founded in 
1972 in Maharashtra. By the 1970s and the 1980s, different and wider themes were taken up 
by Dalit politics, challenging Hindu Brahmanical hegemony and including the plight of the 
‘backward castes’, peasants, women and tribal groups (Omvedt 2006:6) The term  ‘Dalit’ 
came increasingly to signify the expression of defiance on the part of the scheduled castes 
themselves (Sooryamurthy 2008). 
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based, leading also to ‘passive discrimination’ where the lower castes themselves are 
discouraged and lack the self- confidence and encouragement to challenge their historical 
social and economic barriers (Thorat and Newman 2007:4121-4122).  As a result, the living 
standards of the Dalits are associated with lower physical and human capital, and their returns 
on these assets (particularly schooling) are noticeably lower than that of the non-Schedule 
Castes (Kijima 2006). Caste continues to operate in the labour markets by assigning Dalits to 
relatively low-paid jobs and even those with high educational qualifications face 
discrimination at different levels (Banerjee and Knight 1985; Thorat and Atewell 2007). 
The caste system also governs relations between individuals and groups through practices of 
humiliation (Guru 2000). These can be seen from the following examples, demonstrating the 
insecurities of the Dalits in many spaces. While Government’s policies and programmes 
promoted the education of children from the Scheduled Castes, Dalit children often 
experience prejudice, punishment and rejection in the school system, by the other children, 
teachers and even the parents of the children, resulting in a relatively high degree of drop outs 
and poor performance in exams, which in turn, affect their life chances in their future (Sedwal 
and Kamat 2008). In a similar manner, government sponsored mid-day meal scheme and the 
public distribution systems continue to experience problems of caste discrimination and 
restricted access to the Dalits (Thorat and Lee 2003). Discriminative practices include Dalits 
not being allowed to enter non-Dalit households or even eating together (70% of the villages), 
restrictions to entry of religious places (64% of the villages) denying or restricting   access to 
irrigation and water facilities (32% of the villages), public and private services, purchase and 
use of private and public land, including housing as well as entry into village shops, 
restaurants and police stations  (Shah et al 2006).  
These exclusions are often maintained through coercion, threats and physical violence 
reflecting the deficits the Dalits with regard to their human security. The latter involves 
protection against individual violence as well as “human rights, good governance, access to 
education and health care and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to 
fulfil his or her potential”  (Annan: 2000 quoted in Commission on Human Security 2003:8 ) 
and the importance of dealing with, among others,  insecurities that threaten human survival 
or the safety of daily life, or imperil the natural dignity of men and women, (Sen in 
Commission on Human Security 2003:8). 
The human security ‘discourse’ also highlights “interconnections between conventionally 
separated spheres, which helps it to link diverse organizational worlds; and a motivating focus 
on human vulnerability and the human rights that flow for every human being from basic 
human needs” (Gasper 2005: 242). It recognizes that the social relations and the forms of 
governance that form part of the daily existences of people mediate the effectiveness of such 
interventions. As Truong et al have argued, ‘the referent of security is not just the individual 
with rights and entitlements, but also the social relations that mediate human life in ways that 
ensure its quality and flourishing” (Truong 2006: xii). In these ways, the notion of human 
security allows for understanding interconnections and their cumulative impact on the daily 
lives of individuals.  It also underscores that significance of the local and local agents in 
promoting exclusion and inclusion and the need for a comprehensive framework of strategies 
and interventions to counter these problems and enable effective inclusion.  
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These processes have been institutionalised and practised over centuries, exposing the Dalits 
to a rigid and pervasive form of structural violence and social injustice. They have resulted in 
major deficits with regard to their human rights and human development (Thorat 2009; Thorat 
2007: 5-8).  As a result, these groups have been historically disadvantaged with regard to their 
social and economic entitlements and even today continue to face discrimination in economic, 
social, political and cultural social relations, resulting the majority living in deprivation and 
poverty (Thorat 2009: 9). Religious beliefs, societal practices and laws have also often 
exposed women to “multiple and overlapping patriarchies” requiring the law to take into 
account the rights of women in the specific patriarchal arrangements (Sangari 1995). 
The combined effects of violence and deficits to their human rights, human development and 
human security of the Dalits imply their sustained social exclusion. The term ‘social 
exclusion’ is most often used in the European context, for example, to refer to socio-economic 
exclusion, such as long-term unemployment, for example, or systematic exclusion of certain 
groups from integration and citizenship rights (Silver 1995). It is important to recognise that 
social exclusion is a dynamic and on-going process, reflecting “the dynamic processes of 
being shut out, partially or fully, from any or all of several systems which influence the 
economic and social integration of people into their society” (Commins 2004: 68). Applying 
the concept to the problem of caste in India allows for better insights into how various forms 
of disadvantage overlap and reinforce one another (Rodgers et al 1995).  
Social exclusion goes beyond income poverty to allow for the multidimensional nature of 
social deprivation of specific groups, like castes and women (de Haan 1998).5 Sukadeo Thorat 
was the first to pioneer the use of the concept of social exclusion to analyse dynamics of 
caste-based discrimination and their impact on Scheduled Castes. Developing Ambedkar’s 
claim that the primary unit in a Hindu society is caste, Thorat argued that caste functions to 
ostracise and deny basic human rights to the perceived lowest castes, through a host of caste-
based exclusionary practices. According to him, the caste system works as a “regulatory 
mechanism to enforce the social and economic organization through the instruments of social 
ostracism (or social and economic penalties) which has been reinforced with the justification 
and support from the philosophical elements in the Hindu religion” (Thorat 2007: 3). This 
‘forced exclusion” resulted in restrictions experienced by different groups in accessing and 
using land, labour, credit and other resources. The outcome is occupational immobility, with 
those belonging to so-called higher castes assuming rights and privileges of control. 
Inequality, a lack of freedom and the denial of basic human rights thus frame and influence 
the quality of life, indeed life itself, for those assigned to the lowest castes.6  
                                                          
5 Studies, initially undertaken on behalf of the ILO’s International Institute of Labour to 
explore the value of this approach in different contexts and countries, showed that while there 
were differing ways of defining and understanding the excluded, they did show links between 
poverty, inequality and lack of productive employment. The UNDESA report (2010) used the 
social exclusion approach to understand poverty by taking into account identity, social 
relations, as well as non-material dimensions of deprivation (2010: 3). Social exclusion has 
also been extended to include among others, lack of security, lack of justice, lack of 
participation and representation (Kurian and Bedi 2004).  
6 Thorat (2007) has shown that caste-based exclusion occurs in the economic sphere (denial of 
employment, capital, land, etc), and in access to social services (provided by government or 
private agencies). Finally, exclusion is practiced in certain jobs because of notions of purity 
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Accordingly, Thorat proposed a dual solution for promoting social inclusion of Dalits: a set of 
policies for economic empowerment (remedies to improve their access to land, capital, quality 
employment, and education, for example), and equal opportunity legislation to provide 
safeguards against caste discrimination, through caste reservation policies and other, similarly 
targeted policies. He also emphasised the importance of participation of discriminated groups 
themselves in different forms of governance if more ‘inclusive’ policies are to be devised 
(Thorat 2008). Many of these ideas have been taken on board by the government in its 
policies. The next section demonstrates why, in spite of these provisions, laws and 
programmes do not produce the intended outcomes.  
Case study of Dalit Exclusion 
The section complements the available macro-level data by focusing on micro-level analysis 
in two villages, selected to expose local-level dynamics of caste-based power relations in 
Dalits’ daily lives. Since caste-based discrimination is more visible and pervasive in villages, 
and since three-fourths of Scheduled Castes, who make up 16 % of the Indian population, 7  
are located in the rural areas, the authors decided to select two rural case studies. The aim is 
not to generalise from these two cases, but to demonstrate ‘up close’ how interlocking and 
cumulative forms of violent exclusions prevent Dalits, and especially Dalit women, from 
accessing their official legal entitlements. As noted previously, the focus on local interactions 
allows for a deeper understanding of how laws and policies which may be well-designed, still 
have to be struggled for, as the Dalits lives are embedded in semi-autonomous social fields 
where caste-based power relations enforce compliance along lines of inequality and 
discrimination in the daily interactions among people of different castes and across gender 
lines.  
(a)Exclusions at the local level 
The micro-level interactions are based on surveys and interviews undertaken in 2009 in two 
neighbouring villages, Barai Kalyanpur and Nagla Bakhti, located in Awagarh sub-division of 
Etah District in Uttar Pradesh, the largest state in India. As noted earlier, analysing local-level 
interactions is a useful methodology for understanding how caste-based discrimination and 
patriarchal norms can limit the impact of laws and policies on the lives of people (Moore 
1973:  721).  
Both of the selected villages had a substantial Dalit or Scheduled Castes population, eligible 
for a range of poverty alleviation and other special support programmes. This suggested a 
relatively favourable environment for economic and social inclusion of the Dalits, since 
Scheduled Castes constituted 87 per cent of the village population in Barai Kalyanpur and 66 
per cent in Nagla Bhakti. Most of the families who owned less than one hectare land were 
Dalits. Most of the Dalits were eligible for the poverty alleviation and welfare schemes. The 
important programmes that promote inclusion included (a) the Mahatma Gandhi National 
Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS), entitling poor household to 100 days of 
wage-employment during one financial year; (b) housing schemes - Mahamaya Awas Yojna, 
Indira Awas Yojna and Mahamaya Sarvajan Awas Yojna – which provided financial 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
and pollution. All these factors have resulted in denial of equal opportunities to the excluded 
groups. 
7 Although this figure would be higher if all Muslim and Christian Dalits were included. 
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assistance to the build a ‘pucca’ (good) shelter; (c) pensions schemes for widows, the disabled 
and the aged; and (d) Public Ration Distribution Schemes (PDS) to supply grain and essential 
commodities to the poor on a regular basis at subsidized prices in through a network of Fair 
Price Shops. There were also scholarships and other facilities that they could avail. In 
addition, one of the villages, Barai Kalyanpur, referred to as an 'Ambedkar' village,8 received 
a package of 11 welfare schemes,  monitored by an ‘Ambedkar Cell’ headed by the Principal 
Secretary to the provincial Government/the Chief Minister. Special instructions for scheme 
implementation in the “Ambedkar Village” were given to the district officers and downward 
units at the block and villages. 
Our village level surveys showed that Dalits did not fully benefit from these programmes. 
While they were entitled to 100 days of wage employment under the Rural Employment 
Guarantee Scheme, the survey showed that poor Dalit families received some 13 days of 
employment (and payment) and 10-12 days of employment over a period of two years in 
Barai Kayanpur and Nagla Bhakti respectively. Furthermore, just 0.5% of the Dalits in both 
villages were able to access the finance under the housing schemes, while only 20% of the 
Dalits accessed pensions which available to widows, elderly and the disabled. Dalits did fare 
better in accessing the Public Distribution Scheme: 70% of the Dalits in Baraia Kalyanpur 
benefited from government subsidised food and essential commodities, the equivalent figure 
in Nagla Bhakti being 60%.   
There was however little or no knowledge of scholarships and other possibilities to support 
the studies for children of Schedule castes. Thus, in spite of government efforts spanning 
decades, the majority of the Dalits continued to remain poor and excluded from the benefits of 
most government supportive schemes. In addition, there were no significant differences in the 
situation of the Dalits in both villages, although those living in the ‘Ambedkar’ village were 
relatively better off on some aspects. The following sections highlight the local level 
dynamics of exclusions and inclusions in the daily lives of the Dalits. 
(b) Exclusions in Governance  
In line with the official national requirements, there was information placed on the notice 
boards of the Block Development Offices on relevant legislation such as the Untouchability 
Offences Act 1955, the Protection of Civil Rights Act (PCRA) 1976, and The SC & ST 
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 to protect the Dalit community. Information was also 
given on some 18 different welfare schemes, including the MGNREGA, old age and widow 
pension, pension for persons with desabilities, Ambedkar village development scheme, Indira 
AwasYojna, the Below-poverty-line (BPL) ration, Antodaya, clean toilet scheme, free tube-
well boring scheme, loan for self-employment, as well as schemes for the empowerment and 
support of poor girls such the  Savitri Bai Phule Balika  Madad Yojna 9 and Mahamaya Garib 
                                                          
8 The use of the term ‘Ambedkar village’ is linked to the Dalit leaders, Dr Bhim Rao Ambedkar, and his  
championship for the cause of the Dalits as  reflected in the Constitution, which amongst other statements, 
explicitly prohibited discrimination on the grounds of “religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth” Article 15. 
(Human Rights Watch 1999 Appendix A).  
9 Savitri Bai Phule Balika  Madad Yojna (Savitri Bai Phule Girl Child Support Scheme) was 
named after Savitri Bai Phule dedicated her life to teach children from Dalit Communities and 




Balika Ashirvad Yojna10 Such notices suggested that the national government and bureaucracy 
appeared to comply with the requirements that the details of support schemes be placed on 
public notice. But field surveys showed that insufficient efforts were made to disseminate this 
information to the targeted underprivileged. Most of the low-income Dalits who also had low 
levels of education were unaware they were eligible for these schemes and thus did not apply. 
It was clear, therefore, that the government had to take extra efforts to communicate 
effectively and encourage the excluded to avail of schemes in their favour. 
Village development was managed by an elected local government, which functioned as a 
form of self-governance (Panchayati Raj institutions - executive committee of the village 
republic).  While the supportive schemes were based on national and state polices, it was the 
local government in the village, or the Panchayat, led by the Sarpanch, that was influential in 
the implementation of the schemes. The role of caste was clearly visible in local governance 
and in the distribution of the benefits of programmes. The Sarpanches of both villages 
belonged to the ‘higher’ ‘Verma/Thakur’ castes who generally support the right-wing Hindu 
nationalist party, the BJP.  11The Dalits, who formed the majority of the population, voted for 
the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), although there were several instances when they were 
intimidated and forced to vote for the BJP.  
The Sarpanch continued to wield power in the Panchayat,  with members from the ‘lower’ 
castes accepting this situation. And while some Dalits were elected, their attendance at 
meetings remained negligible, as the office bearers of these Panchayats were mostly from the 
dominant caste, with Dalits not informed about the meetings and their voices suppressed 
during the meetings.  
At the same time, the village-level Gram Sabha (general body of the village republic) 
meetings were critical spaces for the selection of the beneficiaries under various welfare 
programmes. Among the issues reviewed were proposals for roads, drainage, street lighting, 
sanitation and jobs, the monitoring of schools as well as of the Health and Child Development 
Centres. The development plan for the villages, including the approval of quarterly 
expenditures and the Panchayat budget, were all undertaken in these Gram Sabha meetings. 
The exclusion Dalits experienced in these discussions meant that their voices and hence their 
access to benefits were limited. 
The norms and practices of patriarchy also pervaded local government, countering the value 
of progressive legislation promoting female representation as heads of local government. The 
                                                          
10 The Mahamaya Garib Balika Ashirvad Yojna  which literally means the ‘Mahamaya Poor 
Girl Child Blessing Scheme' was named after the Chief Minister Mayawati, who  led the 
government in Uttar Pradesh (1995, 1997, 2002-2003 and 2007-2102) and who supported 
many projects for the upliftment of the Bahujans, or the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled 
Tribes. This scheme entitled all girls in families below the poverty line to a government 
fixed deposit (FD) of Rs 22,000 in the form of National Savings Certificate (NSC) which 
would be  in the name of each girl born on or after January 15 in a family living below 
poverty line.  
 
 
11 That the two Sarpanches were supporters of the BJP were confirmed during the  research 
and focused group discussions, as well as from other local sources and the local sources and 




village of Nagla Bakhti was part of the Misakala Panchayat which was a reserved 
constituency for women Sarpanch12. The caste hierarchy was firmly established through the 
formally elected head of the Panchayat being a woman from the Thakur (higher) caste. 
However, the dominance of patriarchal norms meant that her husband and father-in-law 
functioned as de facto  heads of the Panchayat, with many referring to one or the other as the 
Sarpanch in the area. Barai-Kalyanpur - the Ambedkar Village – was also a Panchayat 
reserved for a female Sarpanch. It too was headed by a woman from the Verma (Upper 
Caste), although her husband, who was the former Sarpanch, was referred to as the Sarpanch. 
Thus, enforcing quotas for women, a government legislation with the intention of promoting 
women’s political empowerment was not effective, as caste and patriarchal power relations at 
the local level prevailed. 
 
(c) Caste-Based Atrocities 
One of the pervasive 
characteristics of caste 
discrimination in many Indian 
villages is the prevalence of 
physical violence and coercion 
by the upper castes versus the 
Dalits. The Atrocities Act was 
specifically legislated to deal 
severely with these forms of 
aggression. However, in both 
villages, there were several 
instances where the ‘lower’ 
castes were subject to threats and 
brutality. At the same time, it 
was not uncommon for Dalits 
who challenged caste-based 
violence on the basis of the Atrocities Act to face further exclusion, physical violence and 
intimidation on the part of the ‘upper’ castes. The following examples show how the upper 
castes were able to intimidate the community, the police and even the justice department. At 
the same time, these cases also show how Dalits have responded, using both collective action 
and the law to protect themselves and gain privileges.  
In spite of laws that have prohibited untouchability, such practices remained common in both 
villages. For example, lower caste people were not allowed to sit at the same level as those 
belonging to the higher castes, even after political changes had inttroduced a change in power. 
Even the Sarpanch of nearby Punhera Panchayat, Ashok Balmiki, was not allowed to sit on 
the same cot with the ‘higher’ caste Panchayat members  in the same village. In Isa-Nagri 
(Esoli Panchayat), Balmiki families were not allowed to touch the government water hand 
pump, which is used by whole village. These families were expected to wait for someone to 
come and pour water from the hand pump into their bucket.  
                                                          
12 A Sarpanchis a democratically elected head of  
BOX 1 
Dulare,  a man from the 'untouchable' Balmiki caste, narrated the pain and humiliation  
he felt when a Muslim family beat him up just for standing on a gully with a big sack 
of straw on his head, so that  he could not see an elderly Muslim women coming from 
the back. The lady abused Dulare for his act of insensitivity and words were 
exchanged. As a result, men of the Muslim family came and thrashed him severely. 
Further, they approached Dulare’s neighbor who used to take loans from this Muslim 
family. Dulare’s neighbor was also from the Balmiki community and there was a 
government water hand pump on his land. Under the influence of Muslim family 
Dulare was not allowed to take water from that hand pump. After lots of harassment, 
Dulare filed a complained against both families in the police station under SC/ST 
Atrocities Act 1989 under section 3(1)10. It punishes a person for not less than 6 
months but may extend to five years who  ‘intentionally insults or intimidates with 
intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place 
within public view’. When the villagers supported Dulare’s family, the administration 
was forced to take action and both families apologized to Dulare.    
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These cases illustrate the systematic use of physical and personal violence in enforcing caste 
discrimination in spite of legal penalties associated with such practices, and in many cases, 
with the tacit or real consent of the state machinery. Even in the Ambedkar village (Box 1), 
the police was hesitant to challenge the status quo and it was only through mobilisation on the 
part of the villages from the ‘lower’ castes that attention was given to this problem. 
(d) Government Land Distribution Scheme and Implementation 
Ownership and use of land in villages is of vital importance as a source of income and 
survival, and government land-distribution schemes could be viewed as key to countering 
poverty and social exclusion. Given the skewed distribution of land in the region and the poor 
status of Dalit communities, government had initiated schemes to distribute land to Dalits 
with the intention to provide a means of survival and upward mobility. The field research 
showed that such distribution was severely opposed by those in power if they felt that it 
encroached on their own perceived rights. As most of the land was held by the ‘upper’ castes, 
this meant even if Dalits were entitled to and received land through the government schemes, 
they faced opposition, threats and violence when actually using the property for productive 
purposes (Box 2). Their complaints were also not filed or taken higher, as the local police, 
who were required to do the required First Information Report (FIR), were aware of the local 
power relations and did not wish to oppose those in power, resulting in  ‘upper’ castes  often 
being allowed to commit atrocities and deny Dalits their rights of the land. Thus, while land 
was redistributed, its use and potential were dependent on the decisions of the upper castes. 
This was the case with Dalits from the Ambedkar as well as the non-Ambedkar villages. 






Suresh belongs to the Jatav (Scheduled) caste and lives in Nagla Bakthi – the non- Ambedkar village. While he was working on his 
agricultural field, five people from the Thakur community passed through it harming his crop. When he requested them not to pass 
through his crop as it was getting harmed, the Thakurs claimed that he had insulted them. They abused Suresh and insulted him 
using derogatory remarks. The thakurs decided to teach Suresh and family “a lesson” and came armed and attacked them.  Suresh 
then filed a case under SC/ST atrocities act, but all the witnesses were pressurised by the upper castes  not to support him. The 
opposition advocate, at the Etah session court, was also a close relative of the Thakur community and no other advocate dared to go 
against him.  Suresh changed 6 advocates but continued to face the same problem again and again from his advocate. Suresh has 
been fighting case for the past 8 years. He is mentally tired and his income is also drying up but he says, “I am fighting this case to 
protect my family because as long as case is in the court, Thakurs can not attack us...if I compromise.... and case goes in their 











In Nagla Bakthi for instance, nine families from the scheduled castes received land under the 
state distribution scheme. However, the Etah district session court declared their ownership to 
be illegal. The court in its judgement said that the papers, which are presented in the court by 
the people who owned this land, were forged documents. It was found that the Patwari  (the 
land accountant, who was subsequently suspended) had written the number as 148s acre of 
land for distribution in the  Tehsil document instead of 48 acres, and had distributed the extra 
land to  many people from nearby villages. The nine families from the scheduled castes, who 
developed this land and went through a tedious process with their small savings to pay for this 
piece of land,  were deprived  in the land distribution scheme.  
 
Box 3 
Ramnaresh, from the Kori (weaver) caste, had purchased some land from the government, and laid the foundation for his house,  but 
his neighbour, Mahesh Pal, (from the Thakur  higher caste) objected saying that it did not leave him sufficient space to move his 
tractor.  Although Ramnaresh showed Mahesh Pal all the legal documents establishing his ownership of the land,  indicating the 
necessary space for the tractor to pass by. Mahesh Pal, with his friends, spoke to the head of the village Panchayat and overnight built a 
brick road encroaching on Ramnaresh land, removing the foundation for the house . With the support of some villagers, Ramnaresh 
took up this issue with the government. As a result, the land revenue officer measured the land and decided in favour of Ramnaresh. 
However, the Thakurs refused to accept this outcome. When Ramnaresh tried to file a petition against the Thakurs, the local police, 
including the superintendent in charge, refused to accept it. This forced Ramnaresh to go to the Police headquarters in Etah District. 
During his visit to Etah, the Thakurs set fire to   Ramnaresh’s house resulting in injury to the livestock, as well as  destruction to the 
grain and clothes. Under pressure from the poorer groups in the village, the police finally came to the place and wrote a report in 
favour of Ramnaresh. The Thakurs in the meantime denied their involvement in the fire. The issue was taken up at the Panchayat and a 
compromise was reached by which Ramnaresh was allowed to use the “controversial” land as long as he allowed the Thakur’s vehicle 
to pass along it . The Thakur was penalized for Rs. 2000 ($ 35) for the loss of Ramnaresh’s household goods.  The result was that 
Ramnaresh could neither park his vehicle nor graze or tie his cattle on the controversial land as Thakur  Mahesh Pal frequently moves 







Another example (Box 4) shows how lack of finances stemming from feudal modes of 
payment (including debt bondage) and labour control also play a part in preventing access to 
land.   
What comes out clearly from these examples is that a combination of mechanisms, including 
class and caste power relations, as well as physical and structural violence, are used to control 
the Dalit groups, often perpetuating their exclusions in different domains such as at work, 
within the community, and over their labour. Thus, including them in government schemes 
means countering these controls and exclusions in those interlocking domains, and thus going 
beyond a single or targeted government intervention.  
 
(e) The functioning of the MGNREGA – Nagla Bakhti 
The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) (2005) is 
meant to provide 100 days of employment for unskilled manual work per year, and an 
entitlement to an unemployment allowance in case the work is not provided.  At a meeting 
organised by a member of a supportive NGO, it was found that the majority of those enrolled 
under the MGNREGA in Nagla Bakti were from Scheduled and Backward castes. However, 
they received only between  5-20 days of work over a two-year period (2007-2009), even 
though the money allocated for the scheme had been spent. 
The meeting served as an important platform to air the grievances of the so-called lower 
castes. The Dalits spoke in anger about the close ties that existed between the Sarpanch and 
the supervisor of the programme - who had to report regularly to the Sarpanch - and the fact 
that they belonged to the same Thakur caste. They also spoke about their frustration at the 
malfunctioning of the MGNREGA, including directly challenging the role of the Sarpanch in 
the way the scheme was implemented. Given the increasing political nature of the agitation, 
the Sarpanch was forced to address the workers.  
As mentioned previously, while Prabha Kumari is the legal Sarpanch of Misa Kala Panchayat, 
her husband and father-in-law took all the decisions, executed projects and even represented 
her at meetings – and were also often referred to and called Sarpanch.  In this instance, the 
husband addressed the group as the Sarpanch, and indicated that he had given the contract for 
the scheme to a man who paid the workers. He was of the opinion that this was perfectly 
Box 4 
Nahid s/o Nattu, age 45, father of 6 children from Muslim Sakka (waterman) caste received some 1/10 acre of land from the 
Panchayat, but he did not have money to pay to the Patwari in order to measure and allot that land to him. His whole family - 3 sons 
and 3 daughters - worked on the land of Thakur Shyampal along with him. His family were not paid in wages but instead received 
50% of the crop they harvested.  Nahid’s family remained dependent on the landlord as his family needed his share of the grain for 
their basic subsistence needs. This resulted in Nahid having to borrow extra grain and money from the landlord for any extra or 
unexpected expenditure (such as ill-health) which he then had to repay from his share  of the crop. Thus perpetual debt bondage, 
based on caste and class power relations meant that he was unable to access the government land distribution schemes. 
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appropriate even though it was work registered under the MGNREGA.  On hearing this, the 
workers got angry and submitted all their job cards to the Sarpanch,  made the news public in 
the newspaper, and submitted a memorandum to the District Magistrate. This led to further 
confrontations between the Sarpanch and the workers. When workers went to the Sarpanch 
for employment, he told them, “Go and ask work from the media and District Magistrate, I 
don’t have work for you”. However, seeing the increasing hostility of the workers and their 
threats to take further action, he agreed that he would return the job cards and requested the 
workers to apply for work in writing, so that he could understand as how much work is 
required; and in case work were not available, he could apply for their unemployment 
allowance.  
When asked why not even a single job card was issued to women under MGNREGA, the 
‘Sarpanch’  responded that he understood that women do not like to work in construction, as it 
is against the tradition and not considered good work for them in the village. Women’s groups 
too accepted this argument and requested that if any ‘suitable’ work such as working in plant 
nurseries or tree planting should become available, or if some other work which can be done 
from the home were created,  then they would involve themselves in the MGNREGA.  
This case is important on several scores. It highlights the close relationship between castes 
and class factors:  the Sarpanch and the contractor benefitted on both these scores. These links 
resulted in a distortion of supportive government schemes and programmes. It also shows that 
such patronage relations can exist without impunity, with laws controlled by upper castes and 
classes. The case also illustrates the patriarchal ideology, which assumed that it was not good 
for women to work in construction, and this being the only source of work available. At the 
same time, there is a clear ignorance or inability to get their rightful income (in lieu of days of 
work) as entitled to under the scheme. However, the case also shows how collective action 
and struggle - including using the power of the media -  can challenge some hierarchies.  
(f) Housing Scheme -  Indira Awas Yojna 
There are several welfare schemes available for the Dalits and the poor. One of the most 
important was the Indira Awas Yojna (Indira Housing Scheme) which provided housing 
grants for those officially categorised as ‘below the poverty line’. Most of the Dalits are 
eligible for this support.  However, the ‘custom’ was that all eligible persons applying for 
such a grant had to pay the Sarpanch Rs. 5000 if they wished to avail of the support. This 
payment was rationalised by the Sarpanch on the grounds that he has to pay the Block 
Development Officer in order that the grant be sanctioned. Under these circumstances, the 
poor who applied for these schemes were forced to take loans to pay the required amount. 
These loans were provided by the Thakurs who were also the local moneylenders and 
demanded a very high interest rate (36-72% per annum).  
"We paid Rs. 5000 each to get a house under IAY”, say women in Barai Kalyanpur. Every 
family took loans either from their relatives or from the moneylender to pay the bribe and 
they were still repaying it back on high interest rate up to 3% per month (36% per year). 
Many families like Mehru Nisha, extremely poor and a widow (for 12 years) took a loan to 
pay the bribe. She and her children worked as daily wagers. Every family was granted Rs. 35 
thousand each, however some of the families received Rs. 25 thousand only, and were 
awaiting the remaining amount. From this budget, families were only able to raise walls of a 
single room, and they lived  under a polythene sheet.  
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There were people in the village who were given loans for self-employment schemes. 
However, all of them paid bribes to ‘Suvidha Data’ - meaning service providers. According to 
the Loan Officer, Rakesh Gupta from Khadi Gram13 : ‘it is prepaid channel....pay money and 
get benefit’. However, ‘even if loan application passes through Rakesh Gupta, there is no 
guaranteed that concerned bank will grant it’ says Reverend  Luther, the local priest in Jalesar 
Church who works with rural Dalit in the area. 
In spite of strong support from the then Chief Minister herself, there had not been, during the 
last six months of 2009, a single registration under Mahamaya Garib Balika Ashirvad Yojna 
in this ‘Ambedkar Village’. The same is the case with Savitri Bai Phule Baliaka Siksha 
Madad Yojna, (Singh 2009: 32), though the government  officers of the Secondary Education 
Department stated that 940 million Rs had been deposited in the accounts of 62,975 eligible 
girl students, for their encouragement and as many as 52,082 bicycles had also been 
distributed14 . However, when asked in the village meetings in Barai Kalyanpur, no one, 
except the NGO workers,  knew about the scheme.  
Caste prejudice and collaboration were also part of the implementation issues. For example, 
the  Panchayat documents (Panchayat Barai Kalyanpur 2003-04,  indicated that in the 
selection process of beneficiaries for IAY, a list was prepared by the Sarpanch, and an 
affidavit declared ‘The undersigned (both Sarpanch and Panchayat Secretary) have visited 
above listed families and investigated personally their socio-economic status, that there is no 
one in the village poorer than the listed names. Therefore, the families are found genuinely 
eligible for the mentioned scheme’. Whereas, in reality it was Ram Sahay (Brahmin/Thakur) 
and Ram Charan (Brahmin) who received the housing benefits,  even though they already 
owned houses as well as fertile agricultural land. 
(g) Violence in the daily lives of the Dalits 
The issues raised above are related to the ways in which caste and class have influenced the 
implementation of specific schemes.  While those in power often hijacked the schemes, the 
cases also involved the use of physical violence, humiliation and other means of coercion in 
order to maintain the status quo. In addition, many of the schemes were fragmented 
interventions, and did not take on board the range of vulnerabilities, struggles and 
contestations that shape the lives of Dalits, making it even more difficult for them to access 
special programmes and benefits. The following story of Somati Devi, from the Ambedkar 
village, illustrates the nature of the oppressions that form part of the lives of the Dalits, 
underscoring the need for an integrated framework of interventions (Box 5). 
Box 5 
Somati Devi, a Dalit woman in the village of Barai Kalyanpur (the Ambedkar village which 
has been targeted for special schemes) was around 60 years of age and from the Dhobi’ 
(washerman) caste and in addition fell under the category of the ‘poorest of the poor’. She 
was eligible for a financial support as well as land under a scheme initiated by the Uttar 
Pradesh government. However, being illiterate, she paid for the services of a middleman who 
promised to register land under her name. He cheated her and asked her to work on some free 
                                                          
13 A Gandhian movement to promote Khadi (cotton) and home-made handicrafts for self 
reliance.  
14 Information provided by the Chief Minister’s Office in 2009 during field work. 
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land owned by government. Unaware of the deception, she continued farming this land, until 
it was acquired by Mazhar Khan, one of the powerful men of village Barai Kalyanpur, who 
bribed the authorities and registered a substantial amount of land in his wife’s and son’s name 
under the same scheme. The land that Somvati had been farming on for the last six years was 
technically registered as part of Mazhar Khan’s land. The Khan family asked Somvati to leave 
the land. Somvati and her family resisted him. The next day relatives, especially women of the 
Khan Family, thrashed Somvati on the field. The landlord registered a case against Somvati 
under section 98A pertaining to the illegal occupation of land, while the police arrested her  
son Rameshwar and kept him in the police station for 3 days without charging him with any 
penalty, pressuring him to sign a paper indicating that his family occupied  disputed land so 
that they could charge him under section 98A. Rameshwar refused to sign the paper. In the 
meantime, his relatives and villagers along with the Patwari contacted the Superintendent of 
Police of Etah and some other higher authorities demanding that police should either issue a 
‘challan’ (penalty order) or release Rameshwar.  Rameshwar was released as there was no 
evidence against him.  
Subsequently, Somvati’s family filed a case against the landlord for physical assault and 
forceful removal from their land. The family spent a substantial amount of  money to take the 
case to court  and even sold their only remaining asset - (1 Bigha (1/5 acre) land – to pay for 
the process. While Somvati’s family won the case in Etah session court, the Khan family 
appealed against it in Allahabad High court. The  Somvati family did not have any further 
resources to fight the case further and withdrew themselves and gave up the land. Few months 
later Rameshwar  died of TB.    
In spite of her situation, Somvati did not have an MGNREGA job card,  although her son did 
have one, but he was ill with tuberculosis and unable to work. In fact, out of the 200 job cards 
in the Panchayat area, not a single MGNREGA job card was issued to women. With 
insufficient income, Somvati could not take her son to the hospital for treatment. The 
Sarpanch stated that there were no funds sanctioned from the government for this purpose. 
Somvati also applied for the old age pension but the Panchayat head did not support this 
action. Reports indicated that influential people were against her receiving it.  Somvati had 
applied for housing facilities under IAY long ago, but was again denied by the Sarpanch, who 
claimed there was no quota available at present. However, richer persons in the village who 
were also of a ‘higher’, Brahmin  caste, such as Ram Sahay and Ram Charan were provided a 
house under the scheme. 
Poverty and insecurity – based on both caste and class criteria – framed her existence. She and 
her family did not have any means of production, except her own labour at the age of 60. She 
continued to wash the clothes of upper caste families. In return, she received 10 kg wheat in 
six months from each family. The remuneration was fixed per family and was not dependent 
on the number of clothes she washed. If the family had two sons and they were not married, 
the family would give only 10 kg rice. If the two sons got married, the amount would increase 
to 20 kg extra wheat per family. On the other hand, there was no increase of benefits if the 
family had (married or unmarried) daughters.  
Somvati’s story is illustrative of the myriad of exclusions and human insecurities and that 
form part of her daily existence and which do not allow her to access either her human rights 
or special programmes which are meant to be for her empowerment. Her life demonstrates the 
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ways in which progressive legislation and programmes were either hindered or actively 
usurped by the upper castes and classes for their own benefit. Caste, class and gender power 
relations intersected to maintain the status quo. 
(h) From Violent Exclusions to Human Insecurity and Exploitation 
As the case study evidence has shown, the combination of structural, cultural and personal 
violence, stemming from caste discrimination, continued to limit the value of legislation and 
Government programmes promoting the social inclusion of Dalits. Humiliation and coercion 
were used to denigrate the Dalits and control them in the villages. As Galtung suggests, 
psychological violence can damage ‘the soul’, and destroys feelings of dignity and self-worth. 
Less overt forms of violence as well as physical and structural violence reinforce patterns of 
social injustice and social exclusion over time. In addition, caste-based discrimination was 
closely linked with economic exploitation, as reflected in the examples of housing, land, 
employment generation and other welfare schemes. Protection against individual violence and 
ensuring access to the basic aspects of human security, was far from being achieved in 
practice.  The element of ‘freedom from fear’ embedded in the notion of human security was 
rarely met in practice for Dalit women, in particular, since their multiple exclusions were 
often maintained through coercion, threats and direct physical violence, including sexual 
violence. This means that implementing law in specific localities requires taking into account 
the violations of women’s rights in the local patriarchal arrangements. 
The analysis showed that prevailing power relations undermine government policies, when 
their status as dominant groups is threatened. In this case, those higher up the caste hierarchy 
actively resisted progressive measures and regulations, using a variety of controls  that 
included ideological/religious exclusionary practices as well as physical coercion and political 
influence. As noted by Galtung “(w)hen the structure is threatened, those who benefit from 
structural violence, above all those who are at the top, will try to preserve the status quo so 
well geared to protect their interests” (1969:179). Furthermore, inclusive policies are often 
developed and implemented by people who have historical, cultural and psychological biases 
that influence the terms of inclusion and exclusion.15  
In the context of caste-based discrimination, historical biases associated with discriminatory 
practices of exclusion still prevail in rural village society, influencing the people and 
institutions who implement anti-discrimination programmes locally. As a result, inclusionary 
policies and programmes may be implemented whilst patterns of exclusion remain or even 
intensify.  The ‘model’ of social relations may not be structurally altered.  For example, 
greater participation by Dalits in government programmes provided them with some chances 
of short-term employment, some income and some food, but they retained their prior low 
caste-based social status. This in turn ensures they were incorporated, but adversely 
                                                          
15 In critically reviewing the social inclusion policies of the European Union, O’Brien and 
Penna (2009) observed that social inclusion policies there were embedded in a particular 
“integrative’ model of Europe, and it was necessary to “unpack” this model and its 
assumptions, so as to understand why the policies countering social exclusion were not so 
effective. They found that the policies reflected ‘traditional social profiles’ and stereotyping 
of groups, and put an emphasis on dealing with the consequences rather than the causes of 
discrimination and inequality. Inclusionary policies would need to focus on a particular 
political programme of integration based on specific norms, values and institutions. 
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incorporated, into programmes meant for their benefit, at the lowest levels only, and 
sometimes they were even excluded as the benefits were diverted to others with higher status 
and more control. 
Based on the multiple forms of exclusions embedded in different fields of power relations, 
strategies of change for Dalits will need to be developed at different levels, and political 
alliances will need to be established across caste and identity groups, to effectively promote 
the sustainable social inclusion of Dalits in future. The need becomes even more urgent as 
many government programmes were removed in the subsequent period with the changing 
political climate. 
Concluding remarks: Politics of exclusion and inclusion  
It was clear that despite being the electoral majority in both villages, Dalits were confronted 
with class, caste-based and patriarchal power relations that enforced multiple exclusions and 
physical coercions, hindering their access to government-sponsored poverty alleviation and 
other welfare programmes. These practices acquiesced to the local police, lower bureaucracy 
and judiciary, who were aware of the power of the dominant castes, and in some cases, had 
strong social relations with them. The government programmes remain compartmentalised, 
with the result that Dalits were faced with inadequate information, bureaucratic hindrances 
and could not benefit fully form these schemes.  
These government interventions also did not deal with the interlocking and cumulative nature 
of problems that Dalits face in their day-to-day lives. In the process, Dalits continued to 
experience social subordination, multiple exclusions, and deficits with regard to human rights, 
human development and human security, both in the Ambedkar and the Non-Ambedkar 
villages. In addition, patriarchy intersected all of society, reinforcing the male authority at all 
levels, with Dalit women usually belonging to the lowest ranks of the social hierarchy, and 
most vulnerable to violence, insecurity and problems of accessing welfare and other schemes.     
The government policies and programmes meant to support inclusion contained implicit or 
explicit norms of inclusion which often imply that the  “excluded” groups are expected to fit 
into and accept a particular model of society, which has historically been linked to the more 
powerful groups in society. In spite of political changes and positive intervention of the part 
of the government, caste-based boundaries remained. These norms and practices of the 
dominant upper castes also influenced the politics of inclusion, resulting in manipulating the 
implementation of the schemes, while promoting an adverse incorporation of the Dalits 
through limiting and shaping their involvement. In these ways, the structural, cultural and 
personal/physical violence against Dalits, and particularly Dalit women,  is so embedded in 
society that breaking the mould involves challenging the status quo, confronting the values 
and practices of the more powerful castes and the patriarchal structures that have dominated 
the Indian system historically and to this day.  
Under these circumstances, it is important to recognise that a single strategy or intervention 
cannot counter the interlocking and cumulative nature of exclusions. Multiple strategies taken 
at different levels and with different stakeholders need to be developed to help governments 
to promote, in line with the 16th SDG, a more equitable, just and inclusive society. The 
success of collective organisation and struggles, however limited, has however demonstrated 
the value and significance of supporting and involving the Dalits themselves in challenging 
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the status quo. They are the people who know the lived experiences of exclusion and are vital 
to bring about change.  
In a positive contrast, activities of the Andhra Pradesh Vyvasaya Vruthidarula Union  
(APVVU) federation of 428 trade unions of rural informal workers formed at the subnational 
administrative unit, demonstrate the potential of such multiple level strategies, networks and 
struggles to effectively work for the empowerment of the Dalits, workers in the informal 
economy and poor women.16 At the same time legislation, favourable government schemes 
and supportive NGOs need to use a more comprehensive framework of intervention 
recognising and challenging the cumulative effect of the different forms of exclusions and 
violence at the local level and in the daily lives of the excluded. What the experiences of the 
Dalits in this article have shown is that promoting sustainable inclusion for the excluded 
involves developing appropriate conceptual tools and policy frameworks that acknowledge 
and counter the multiple and cumulative exclusions they experience, and recognising the need 
for multiple alliances and multiple strategies that to promote, in line with the 16th SDG, a 
more equitable, just and inclusive society.  
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